revenue-sharing contract
در نشریات گروه صنایع-
هدف
دولت ها امروزه به مدیریت محیط زیست و مشکلات اقتصادی پیرامون آن برای محافظت از محیط زیست روی آورده اند؛ بنابراین، شرکت ها تلاش می کنند تا برای باقی ماندن در جامعه رقابت کنند. در این مقاله توافقنامه ای برای تقسیم درآمد بین خرده فروش و تولیدکننده وجود دارد. این قرارداد به گونه ای طراحی شده است که هزینه های تحقیق و توسعه ای که تولیدکننده برای سبز کردن محصولات متحمل می شود را کاهش دهد. این مقاله همچنین مازاد مصرف کننده را برای بعد اجتماعی در نظر می گیرد که یکی از ابعاد پایداری است.
روش شناسی پژوهش:
مداخلات دولت در این مقاله به صورت یارانه هایی است که قیمت نهایی محصول را تعیین می کند. درواقع، این مقاله برای اولین بار هر سه بعد پایداری، یعنی ابعاد اجتماعی، اقتصادی و محیط زیستی را در یک مدل نظریه بازی با مداخله دولت و همچنین توافقنامه تقسیم درآمد بین خرده فروش و تولیدکننده در نظر می گیرد.
یافته هانتایج مدل سازی نشان داد با افزودن تاثیر مازاد مصرف کننده، عملکرد سود دولت و تولیدکننده افزایش می یابد. اگرچه مازاد مصرف کننده باعث کاهش قیمت عمده فروشی و همچنین تقسیم درآمد می شود، اما مقدار فروش محصولات افزایش می یابد. این موضوع سود مشتریان و همچنین سود اعضای زنجیره را افزایش می دهد و به بهبود سبزینگی و افزایش سطوح سبزینگی کمک می کند و مشتریان تمایل دارند محصولات با سبزینگی بالاتر خریداری کنند، اما هزینه های بالاتر تولید نیاز به هزینه های تولید بالاتر دارد. تولیدکنندگان با تحقیق و توسعه و بالا بردن آگاهی مردم درباره محصولات سبز فروش خود را افزایش می دهند؛ بنابراین تولیدکنندگان و خرده فروشان و همچنین دولت قیمت ها و مقدار یارانه ها را برای به حداکثر رساندن سود خود تنظیم می کنند و سودآوری کلی زنجیره تامین تغییر می کند. نتایج نشان می دهد که سطح رفاه اجتماعی یکی از مهم ترین مباحث در زنجیره تامین است و همچنین سود اعضای زنجیره و سطح تولید سبزیجات را افزایش می دهد.
اصالت/ارزش افزوده علمی:
این مقاله برای اولین بار تمامی ابعاد پایداری، ازجمله بعد اجتماعی، اقتصادی و محیط زیستی را در یک چارچوب نظری با مداخله دولت و تاثیر مازاد مصرف کننده بر سیاست های قیمت گذاری و سبزسازی محصولات بررسی کرده است. افزوده علمی این تحقیق در ارایه بینش های جدید به مدیران و سیاست گذاران جهت بهبود تصمیم گیری های استراتژیک در راستای ارتقای پایداری و رفاه اجتماعی در زنجیره های تامین محصولات سبز است.
کلید واژگان: زنجیره تامین سبز، قرارداد تقسیم درآمد، مداخله دولت، سبزسازی، نظریه بازی، مازاد مصرف کنندهPurposeGovernments today are increasingly focused on managing environmental and economic challenges to safeguard the environment. Consequently, companies are striving to remain competitive in society. This paper introduces a revenue-sharing agreement between the retailer and the manufacturer. The contract is designed to alleviate the research and development costs incurred by the manufacturer in greening their products. Additionally, the paper incorporates consumer surplus as a consideration for the social dimension, which is a key pillar of sustainability.
MethodologyGovernment interventions in this paper are modeled as subsidies that influence the final price of the product. Notably, this study, for the first time, integrates all three dimensions of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental—within a game-theoretic framework that includes government intervention and a revenue-sharing agreement between the retailer and the manufacturer.
FindingsThe modeling results demonstrated that incorporating consumer surplus enhances the profitability of both the government and the manufacturer. Although consumer surplus reduces wholesale prices and revenue-sharing proportions, it leads to increased product sales. This boosts the benefits for consumers and members of the supply chain, contributing to improved greenness and higher levels of product sustainability. Consumers show a preference for purchasing products with greater environmental benefits; however, higher levels of greenness require increased production costs. Manufacturers can boost their sales through research and development efforts and by raising public awareness about green products. As a result, manufacturers, retailers, and the government adjust prices and subsidies to maximize their respective profits, altering the overall profitability of the supply chain. The findings highlight that social welfare is a crucial consideration in supply chains, as it significantly enhances the profitability of chain members and promotes higher levels of green production.
Originality/Value:
This paper is the first to examine all dimensions of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental—within a theoretical framework that incorporates government intervention and the impact of consumer surplus on pricing policies and the greening of products. The scientific contribution of this research lies in providing new insights to managers and policymakers to enhance strategic decision-making aimed at improving sustainability and social welfare within green supply chains.
Keywords: Green Supply Chain, Revenue-Sharing Contract, Game Theory, Government Intervention, Consumer Surplus -
مدیریت زنجیره تامین پایدار، رویکردی در مدیریت زنجیره تامین است که هدف آن لحاظ مسائل اقتصادی، زیست محیطی و اجتماعی به صورت هم زمان است. در این مطالعه، یک زنجیره تامین دوسطحی شامل تولیدکننده و خرده فروش لحاظ شده است که تولیدکننده درمورد سطح سبز بودن و میزان اهدا محصول، خرده فروش در مورد قیمت فروش محصول تصمیم گیری می کنند. مدل سازی مساله در سه مرحله غیر متمرکز، متمرکز و تحت قرارداد بررسی می شود؛ در بخش نخست هریک از اعضا به صورت مستقل و در بخش دوم به صورت مدیریت واحد برای کل زنجیره تصمیم گیری می شود. در نهایت قرارداد اشتراک درآمد و اشتراک هزینه برای مشارکت اعضای زنجیره تامین مدل سازی می شود. نتایج نشان می دهند که مدل هماهنگی، جایگزین مناسبی برای سایر مدل ها است. هدف پژوهش حاضر، بهینه سازی تصمیمات قیمت گذاری، عملکرد سبز و مسئولیت اجتماعی در زنجیره تامین پایدار دوسطحی است.
کلید واژگان: زنجیره تامین پایدار، هماهنگی در زنجیره تامین، قرارداد اشتراک درآمد، قرارداد اشتراک هزینه، مسئولیت اجتماعی، قیمت گذاریJournal of Industrial Engineering Research in Production Systems, Volume:11 Issue: 22, 2024, PP 19 -29In today's world, due to the increase in competition between organizations and the increase in environmental and social concerns, sustainable supply chain management is a competitive advantage for organizations. Sustainable supply chain management is an approach in supply chain management with the aim to consider economic, environmental and social issues together. In this study, we consider two-echelon supply chain that consists both manufacturer and retailer in which the manufacturer decides on green quality of the product and level of health products donation as a social responsibility, and retailer decides on the selling price of the product to the end customers. We assumed that the customer has a social and environmental awareness and the demand is a function of the selling price, level of donation and green quality of the product. Generally, with an increase in the level of donation and the greenness of the product, the demand increases, and with an increase in the selling price of the product, the demand decreases. The results show that the coordination model in this sustainable supply chain is an appropriate alternative in comparison with the other models.
Keywords: Sustainable Supply Chain, Supply chain coordination, Revenue-Sharing Contract, Cost-Sharing Contract, Social Responsibility, Pricing -
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management Studies, Volume:9 Issue: 2, Summer-Autumn 2022, PP 45 -63
In the proposed study, an inventory model of a two-echelon green perishable supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer is investigated. The produced items have a deterministic shelf life and will be removed from the shelves when they reach to their expiration date. A novel formulation of the demand function is also presented, which is a multiplicative function of time after replenishment, retail price, and green improvement level. The formulated demand function increases with the time to expiration and the green improvement degree; it also decreases with the retail price. The mentioned characteristics in this supply chain are derived from the industries of selling fruits, vegetables, meat and poultry, as well as dairy products. The manufacturer is considered the leader of the Stackelberg game, and three approaches are proposed to solve the inventory model: Decentralized, Centralized, and Coordinated by the revenue and green technology investment cost sharing contract, which guarantees more profit for each member than the decentralized decision-making approach. The numerical results demonstrate that the proposed revenue-sharing contract could successfully help the supply chain members to achieve the potential supply chain profit in the centralized approach. A comparative study is also conducted to show the differences between implementing and not implementing green technology investments, which shows the profitability of making green technology investments when consumers have green preferences. It was observed that as the reservation cost increases, the importance of investments in green technology will increase for both parties. Also, with high potential market demand, it is more beneficial to invest in green technology. This study deals with a contribution to the formulation of the demand function, as a novel multiplicative function of time after replenishment in the form of power function, and retail price and green improvement level in the form of complementary linear function.
Keywords: supply chain coordination, revenue sharing contract, perishability, green technology investment, Stackelberg game -
International Journal of Supply and Operations Management, Volume:8 Issue: 1, Winter 2021, PP 69 -80
Sustainability and low-carbon manufacturing have been under the scrutiny of the academics and practitioners, along with the governmental and non-governmental organizations. Not to mention the growing awareness and concern of the consumers about the carbon footprint, leading the researchers to the joint problem of sustainable supply chain coordination and emission abatement. This study contributes to the current literature by developing a contract for a dyadic supply chain model under a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game where emission abatement is a key decision. Implementing a green-sensitive consumer preference and carbon abatement level into the demand function, a revenue-sharing contract is conducted to solve the channel conflict and double marginalization effect. The analytical results and numerical example prove the profit improvement of both channel members and validate the effectiveness and environmental-friendliness of the constructed supply chain structure.
Keywords: Low-carbon supply chain, Carbon tax, Revenue sharing contract, Supply chain coordination -
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management Studies, Volume:7 Issue: 1, Winter-Spring 2020, PP 107 -123One of the main concerns of all industries such as mine industries is to increase their profit and keep their customers through improving quality level of their products; but increasing the quality of products usually releases air pollutants. Nowadays the management of air pollutant emissions with harmful environmental and health effects is one of the most pressing problems. In this paper, authors study the decision behaviour and coordination issue of a mining metal three-level supply chain with one supplier (extractor), one mineral processor and one manufacturer. We compare the decentralized and the centralized systems and reduce air pollutant emission by designing a revenue sharing contract for the mentioned decentralized supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation. Finally, a numerical example shows that the designed contract not only provides win-win condition for all supply chain members and increases whole supply chain profit but also reduces harmful air pollutant emissions in the supply chain.Keywords: mining metals supply chain, channel coordination, emissions reduction, revenue sharing contract
-
در این تحقیق یک زنجیره ی تامین دوسطحی، شامل یک تولیدکننده به عنوان طراح قرارداد و یک خرده فروش به عنوان طرف قرارداد در نظر گرفته شده است. خرده فروش در محیط مدل روزنامه فروش اقدام به سفارش دهی به تولیدکننده می کند. تصمیمات بهینه ی قیمت گذاری توسط تولیدکننده و سفارش دهی توسط خرده فروش، طبق دو قرارداد عمده فروشی و قرارداد هماهنگ کننده ی تسهیم سود، بررسی شده اند. با توجه به اهمیت قرارداد عمده فروشی از جنبه های عملی، رابطه ی مشخصی برای قیمت عمده فروشی،در شرایط تقاضا با توزیع نرخ خرابی عمومی افزایشی ارائه شده است. همچنین، نحوه ی چانه زنی طرفین قرارداد برای تصاحب سود حاصل از هماهنگ سازی سیستم طبق قرارداد تسهیم سود، بررسی و مقادیر تعادلی پارامترهای این قرارداد به صورت تحلیلی محاسبه شده است. طبق نتایج حاصل از بررسی های عددی، اگر تغییرات در یک سیستم در راستای بهبود شرایط، یعنی افزایش قیمت یا کاهش هزینه ها، باشد استفاده از یک قرارداد هماهنگ کننده مانند تسهیم سود نسبت به قرارداد عمده فروشی، ارزشمندتر و سودآورتر خواهد بود.کلید واژگان: هماهنگ سازی زنجیره ی تامین، قرارداد عمده فروشی، قرارداد تسهیم سود، مدل چانه زنی، تعادل نشSupply chain contracts, e.g. revenue sharing contracts, are useful schemes for system coordination. In practice, however, because of different reasons, such as limited information or administrative difficulties, design of coordinating contracts may be hard or impossible. In this situation, the importance of a simple wholesale price contract becomes clearer. Even if a coordinating contract is usable, bargaining on the profit arisen from system coordination would be a challenging subject that requires due consideration. Thus, investigation of wholesale price contract and the bargaining issue between contract partners, in case of the revenue sharing contract, are two features of
this research.
In this research, a two echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered. The manufacturer is contract designer. The retailer supplies its required material from the manufacturer and prepares final product for a selling season with stochastic demand. In case of a wholesale price contract, the retailer places order to the manufacturer, after receiving its wholesale price. Optimal pricing and ordering decisions, in case of the wholesale price contract, is investigated. Nevertheless this contract is not a coordinating contract, however it is important from practical dimensions. Therefore, as theorem one, a specific relation for the optimal wholesale price
is presented. In this theorem it is assumed that demand has increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR). Usual demand distributions such as normal, uniform and gamma, has this feature.
In the following, the design of the revenue sharing contract is investigated. According to this contract the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price in return of receiving a portion of the retailer's sales profit. Considering a bargaining power for each member, as theorem two, the parameters of revenue sharing contract in Nash equilibrium are determined.
Finally, with the numerical analysis, optimal decisions and expected profit of contract partners, in cases of wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts, are analyzed. According to the results, if the changes in a system are towards improvement of situation, e.g. increase of price or decrease of costs, implementation of a coordinating contract will be more profitable compared to the wholesale price contract.Keywords: Supply chain coordination, wholesale price contract, revenue sharing contract, bargaining model, nash equilibrium -
International Journal of Supply and Operations Management, Volume:1 Issue: 4, Winter 2015, PP 439 -465Considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. Considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, Stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. A general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract and centralized structure. Based on this model, we numerically analyzed the performance of revenue sharing contract in the considered supply chain and four states for revenue sharing contract are analyzed at the end. Moreover, in each state, performance of the system under revenue sharing contract is compared with the performance of the system under wholesale price contract and centralized structure.Keywords: Vendor managed inventory, Stackelberg game, Revenue sharing contract, Wholesale price contract, Centralized structure
- نتایج بر اساس تاریخ انتشار مرتب شده‌اند.
- کلیدواژه مورد نظر شما تنها در فیلد کلیدواژگان مقالات جستجو شده‌است. به منظور حذف نتایج غیر مرتبط، جستجو تنها در مقالات مجلاتی انجام شده که با مجله ماخذ هم موضوع هستند.
- در صورتی که می‌خواهید جستجو را در همه موضوعات و با شرایط دیگر تکرار کنید به صفحه جستجوی پیشرفته مجلات مراجعه کنید.
©2000-2025 magiran.com All Rights Reserved.