Semantic Meditations on the Nature of Moral Value

A deep gap between semantic and ontological features of value-categories has been encouraged by some moral theories, in particular, the ones proposing a monotheistic account of moral values. However, it seems that any successful ontological account of values should be based on our conceptual and semantic intuitions. In this paper, I will propose a semantics for good and bad, on the basis of which I will show that we find some praiseworthiness and admirability in valuable and moral things and this is what has been ignored in a theory like that of necessity in comparison to something else which is proposed as a theory of value and a famous version of which is a monotheistic one. Such a theory would suffer an unwanted consequence: our primary conceptions of the valuability of the moral would not be reliable and our epistemic access to values would be difficult, and for such difficulty, the epistemic and thus the moral deviations and disputes would be more likely.