Introspection and Wittgenstein's View on Private Language Argument

Wittgenstein's view on the so-called “private language argument” is among the most important parts of his school of thought in the second period of his philosophical life. Here, there is one basic question that is whether we can imagine a language whose terms are merely understandable for the person using it. Whilst by giving reference to the lack of condition available to explicate the meaning of internal entities and feelings, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that such terms and words are private, and he argues that this language is not acceptable and imaginable because our sensory language depends on the physical world. In this article, we firstly try to analyze the concept of introspection to conceive a better perception of the private language argument. Then, we will investigate Wittgenstein’s approach about the so-called “private language argument” which is based on two fundamental concepts, namely meaning condition and Rule-guided argument, and will show how he is able to express his argument with a realistic attitude of meaning.