Functionalism in Conventional Subjects of Religious Verdicts

Issues which are taken as the subjects of statements in legislating and in religious reasoning are either conventional or invented by the legislator. Conventional subjects taken from general or particular convention which have not been mentioned by the legislator are divided into ‘deduced conventional’ and ‘simple conventional’. What the present article claims is that in simple conventional issues unconditionally and in deduced conventional issues depending upon proofs, their functions in individual and social relationships are certainly or with a reasonable and notable probability, subjects for statements. Thus, if as changes occur in time or place, their primary functions vanish, the previous statements cannot be proved for them on the basis of previous reasons; for if proving argument which proves the statement is verbal, since its appearance has been disturbed, it can be no more referred to; and if it is not verbal, the statement will not fall within the circle of its certainty. Thus, to find their new statements, one has to refer to other proofs.