The Impact of Information Asymmetry on the Future Stock Price Crash Risk of Listed Companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange

Managers as those responsible for providing financial statements may try to provide a good picture of their firm’s conditions. Therefore, they tend to delay the disclosure of bad news and release the good news as soon as possible. Managers’ tendency toward hiding bad news increases the stock price risk. With the increase of information asymmetry between a firm and the market, managers have more abilities and opportunities to withhold bad news and accelerating the release of good news. As a result, it is expected that the information asymmetry between managers and investors increases future stock price crash risk. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between information asymmetry and the future stock price crash risk. In so doing, we identify one main hypothesis and three subsidiary ones. To test our hypotheses, we select a sample of listed companies in the Tehran stock exchange during 1380-1392 (2001-2013). Moreover, the panel data and logistic regression methods are used. Results show that there is a positive relation between information asymmetry and future stock price crash risk.