Analysis of Great Power's success and failiure's Coercive Strategies in asymmetric conflicts

In asymmetric conflicts, major powers often adopts coercive strategy toward weak states which includes threats, encouragments, positive inducements, and compromises, and is an alternative for absolute and swift military or war strategies. Because this strategy held promise of foreign policy achievements while avoiding heavy military spending or the cost of the war strategy. Based on an old principle of the theory of international relations the threats of more powerful states are more effective, because the penalty for target disobedience will be more intensive. With regard to this matter it seems to be that the weak states must submitto major powers coercive (deterrent and compellence) requests easily. But why sometimes the evidence and experimental studies shows the failure of this strategy in result of the resistance of weak states which major powers finally choose the costly military strategy? This is a question that the present article is trying to answer with this hypothesis that ithe greater the coercive requests of the great powers threatens the survival of a weak state the more probable the failure of the coercive strategy will be