Phenomenology, Critique of Skepticism and Justification of Monistic Ontology

For Hegel unknowability of thing in itself in Kant's philosophy is equivalent to skepticism and he quests the reason of this failure in the critical method; For Hegel the failure of critical method lies in the pre-evaluation of possibility of knowledge, so this method of critique presuppose the subjectivism and so the impossibility of absolute. This article will argue that how Hegel with phenomenology recognizes the legitimacy of critical method and how he proposes an alternative for it which does not have the defect of subjectivism. In interpretation of phenomenology as an argument against skepticism three rival interpretation has been proposed. Two of them interpret phenomenology without any ontological commitment and the third interpret phenomenology as an argument for an ontological entity called absolute idea. By critical examination of three alternative interpretations of phenomenology, this article demonstrates that the final result of phenomenally is an ontological principle i.e. absolute idea, because the truth cannot be based on the immediate certainty of consciousness. So this new method of critique will be transitional (like platonic ascent) i.e. will be an ascent from immediate certainty of consciousness to truth of absolute Idea as an identity of indelibility and being.