Responsibility against death of the other: foundation of subject in philosophy of levinas

Concept of the other in philosophy of Levinas gives identity to his other concept. He criticizes the epistemology and ontology, at the same time questions the integrity of the subject and the universality of other. According to Levinas the other is possibility to deny the totality of the subject and possibility to transcendence to go beyond static identity. This article tries to show that relationship between subject and the other is not cognitive or ontological, but it's foundation is ethical relationship that is formed in proximity the other. The most important dimension of other's existence that we understand it, is the moment of his/her death. This leads to fundamental ethical relationship in which responsibility for the death of the other is the most important aspect of realization of our being. According to us, understanding being, as Heidegger insists on it, is not being toward death through a genuine relationship with his own death, but we believe that other's death is the moment of devastating departure to find out such a being tied with the nothingness. The existence is realized in being for other and subjectivity in the acts of relation to the other and subsequently by protecting others against death.