Is There Anything to Say About Mental Existence? Criticism about theory of mental existence and define a new role for it

Regarding the theory of mental existence, Muslim philosophers have presumed the issues of scientific reality and the match between objectivity and subjectivity. However, this presumption is faced with different challenges and it seems that indeed these challenges do not allow the mental existence to have the sufficient efficiency. On the other hand, the ideas of contemporary philosophers including Quine and Davidson essentially challenge the very idea of a match between subjectivity and objectivity, which is the prerequisite of the mental mode of existence. These philosophers believe that we have to use epistemology or semantics for addressing existential issues. We try to show that having accepted these criticisms, mental existence cannot fully play its previous role; however, by assuming the acceptance of the principle of mental existence and recognizing mental creatures, we can define a new role for this mode of existence. Here, we will question the relation between mind and mental creatures considering the understanding and construction of language expressions. Also, we will try to show that the response given to the question “how do we reach an understanding of sentences or lingual expressions?” based on prescriptive rules (grammar) is in odds with recognizing the characterization of mental creatures; accordingly, accepting the mental mode of existence will lead to the fact that language rules are descriptive and not prescriptive.