Allāma Ṭabāṭabā ī's Theory of Social Justice and its Foundations

The issue of justice has always been central for intellectuals. In this paper, we have provided an examination, analysis, and a logical presentation of the theory of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī concerning social justice. The research is concerned with the identification of the foundations of the theory of social justice in the views of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and the way he finds his way from these foundations to his theory of social justice. Moreover, we have examined the origin of the goodness of social justice as well as its absoluteness or relativity from his view. Conventional perceptions (idrākāt-e itibārī) consist in the deployment and collection of foundations on the basis of which ‘Allāma analyzes social justice. Self-love motivates human persons to appropriate all interests to themselves. Human persons inevitably accept social justice in order to make their own gains of personal interests possible. The criterion of essential goodness and badness of happiness and misery—and the conventional justice—is their being pleasant or unpleasant to the human nature. Justice is good, because it is required for the human happiness. Moreover, the definition of justice shows that it is a philosophical secondary intelligible, and thus, it enjoys absolute goodness.