A Critique of Bernard William's Theory of Moral Luck
Bernard Williams introduced the notion of ‘moral luck’ to emphasize that the moral value is not independent of external circumstances, including luck; rather they are, to a great extent, dependent on luck. In ordinary lives, moral agents may well be praised or blamed because of doing things over which they do not have, at least complete, control. Indeed, these praises or blames are tied with good or bad consequences of the action that agents are lucky or unlucky to face. This is where moral luck comes into play. The problem of moral luck is interlocked with the problem of moral responsibility, highlighting the question that if according to the common sense, moral judgment should only be made about things under the control of the agent (the principle of control), then why do we sometimes judge on the basis of things outside the control of the agent? The problem will be more significant if we have an eye to the claim of evolutionary ethics, because if we are committed to the principle of control, no moral judgment can be valid. In this paper, I will illuminate and examine Williams’ approach to moral luck.
Quarterly Journal of Moral Studies, Volume:1 Issue: 1, 2017
دانلود و مطالعه متن این مقاله با یکی از روشهای زیر امکان پذیر است:
اشتراک شخصی
با عضویت و پرداخت آنلاین حق اشتراک یک‌ساله به مبلغ 990,000ريال می‌توانید 70 عنوان مطلب دانلود کنید!
اشتراک سازمانی
به کتابخانه دانشگاه یا محل کار خود پیشنهاد کنید تا اشتراک سازمانی این پایگاه را برای دسترسی نامحدود همه کاربران به متن مطالب تهیه نمایند!
  • حق عضویت دریافتی صرف حمایت از نشریات عضو و نگهداری، تکمیل و توسعه مگیران می‌شود.
  • پرداخت حق اشتراک و دانلود مقالات اجازه بازنشر آن در سایر رسانه‌های چاپی و دیجیتال را به کاربر نمی‌دهد.
In order to view content subscription is required

Personal subscription
Subscribe magiran.com for 50 € euros via PayPal and download 70 articles during a year.
Organization subscription
Please contact us to subscribe your university or library for unlimited access!