Criteria for Distinguishing Judgment from Right in Legal Theories

The issue of confusion between rights and judgments and the ways out of this challenge and contrast are the fundamental debates in the field of law and jurisprudence and sometimes other fields of human sciences such as ethics and politics. Identifying and argument about the principles and general regulations and rulings in this case, such as rules and regulations in inference in wrong cases between right and law and determination and distinctions is faced with various viewpoints and comments, from among which five theories have been considered important. Principality of judgment, the theory of non-rightfulness, theory of reference to the appearance of texts, detailed theory, and proportionality between the sentence and the subject theory. Since the main fundamental problem and challenge in this issue is the non-attention of the learned scholars to the criteria and capabilities of right for relinquishment, transference, and the reason for the lack of these capabilities in some referents of right, some rights have such capabilities and some have no such capabilities and will therefore be confused with judgment. In this article, the presented theories are revised and criticized and the proportionality between judgment and subject theory is analyzed and provided as a solution for this problem in appropriate evaluation of the relations between judgment and its subjects.