Investigating the Audit Fees Stickness and Structural Effects on Auditing Audit Deviation from the Standard Model

Agency problems as a result of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is created. Meanwhile, auditing is an effective way to limit the powers of managers in contractual relationships. This study shows that the model, due to the ignorance of cost-stickiness, is not fully able to explain the cost of independent auditing. The present study investigates Stickness audit fees, adjustments to increase or decrease the differences in long-term deals. As well as structural factors affecting the deviation from the standard model include audit fees, reward management and the board's overconfidence. For this purpose, a sample of 134 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange has been selected for the period from 1386 to 1394. Testing of research hypotheses has been done using the regression model of combined data. The results show that the increase in audit costs, while waiting for an increase, is greater than the reduction in the cost of the audit, while waiting for a reduction, which means that the cost of the audit is sticky. Additionally, the audit fee stickiness of one The specified trend does not follow and changes over long periods of time. The results also indicate that more manager's confidence and board rewards will increase the deviation from the standard audit fee model and increase the increased (upward) level of audit fees.