Levinas and Infinity: Phenomenology of Ethical Experience

Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most important philosophers in the twentieth century. This is because of the fact that he has been an influential figure in development of post- structuralism in the French culture. He also has an ambivalent attitude to phenomenology: he is one of the first pupils and first interpreters of Husserl and Heidegger; however, he has put forward numerous critics on Husserl and specially Heidegger in his books such as totality and infinity. This article argues that the reason for his reproach and separation from phenomenology lies in his effort to scrutinize the concept of infinity. Starting from this point, Levinas has reconsidered numerous taken-for-granted views about language, knowledge, ordinary communication and subjectivity. Other, face and such concepts, which are central to Levinas’ works, are offspring of his engagement with infinity. What is common between them is that they impose on subject responsibility and shame about what she has done toward the other. This shame and responsibility toward the other arise from the desire for infinity and movement in his direction. Levinas believes human subjectivity is first of all an endless responsibility towards the other. Responsibility towards the other and desire to infinity, which are identical in Levinas’ view, are the basic terms of ethical experience.