The Type and Scope of the Role of Existence in Essential Predications in Allama Tabatabaie's View

After proving the originality of existence, investigating the role of existence in essential predications is of the same importance as originality of existence, and is somehow a completion to it. In his works, Allama Tabatabaie has dealt with resolving that puzzle, but it seems that the expositors have depleted those statements of innovation. In the present article, we criticize a view according to which existence plays role in the form of a part of substratum, in a way that the formation of essential attribution is realized through the essence becoming the substratum to the restriction of existence. Then, we defend a view that considers existence the whole substratum. According to that view, if the essential products are properly constructed in the form of a sentence, they would be, in effect, the attributes of existence. Besides, one cannot absolutely defend the role of existence being the whole substratum; rather, this precept is specified to the external effects of the essence, and the existence is not described by the mental effects of essence.