The non-assignment rule in Iranian constitutional law system by looking at the views and procedures of the Guardian Council

One of the most important economic and financial principles of the budgeting process is the principle of non-allocation which reflects rejecting the forecast of dedicated income for various governmental institutions. This principle is rooted in the Article 53 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The present research is concerned with a descriptive-analytic method to clarify the stance of the non-allocation principle in the Constitutional law system of Iran with a view to the decisions and precedent of the Guardian Council as well as explaining the manner in which this principle is reflected in the Constitutional law resources of Iran. This study indicates that this principle has never been fully implemented in Iran. Despite the emphasis of the Article 53 of the Constitution on the necessity of concentrating all government receipts in the central treasury accounts with no exceptions, as well as the non-acceptance of specific expenditures for resources before the beginning of the fiscal year and outside the annual budgets pursuant to Article 52 of the Constitution, some violations of the above Article in the General Policies of the System are seen. Besides, the examination of the Guardian Council's precedent implies in some cases the non-compliance of the philosophy of ratifying the Article 53 of the Constitution.