Foundationalism in Naturalist moral reductionism

According to ethical naturalism, ethical properties are reduced to natural and experimental immoral features such as pleasure and prosperity. In this approach, beliefs that are the basis for justifying of ethical beliefs, rely on immoral observations. This claim is based on the acceptance of " Inference of ought from being" and its extension to the field of Moral epistemology. I believe that this approach, with the title of non-intutional ethics fundamentialism, has responded to the regress argument, although it faces with challenges that are addressed in this paper, in addition to its emphasis on moral justification. The consequence of explaining the present approach is that there is a link between normative and ethics and meta - ethics, in such a way that the discussion justifies the ethical belief that influences the identification of the domain of the instances of moral normative theory, in particular utilitarianism and naturalistic self-egoism.