A Critical Study of Fakhr Rāzī’s Critiques on Avicenna’s Arguments in Invalidation of Metempsychosis

Metempsychosis is connection of the spirit to another body proportionate to it after disintegration of its own body. Avicenna has provided three arguments on invalidation of metempsychosis. According to the firs argument, the prerequisite of metempsychosis is the conjunction of two spirits in one body; and according to the second argument, the prerequisite of metempsychosis is a time lapse taking place between disconnection of the spirit from the first body and connection to the second. Rāzī’s criticisms of the first argument results from fallacious reasoning on the following instances: oneness of humankind species; invalidity of random volition; soul’s need for body in performing actions; existential and not essential capability of body in relation to the soul and non-priority of the reincarnated soul in relation to the contingent soul in connection to body. Rāzī’s objections to the second argument results from non-deliberation on the following notions: the principle of “no idleness for existence”, entitlement of the partial souls to celestial body; freedom of soul from the body in case of being actualized and inequality of the souls that die with the souls that are born.