Examining the Monitoring Role of the Board of Directors in Tax Aggressiveness of Family Firms Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange

The purpose of this research is to examine the monitoring role of the board of directors in tax aggressiveness of family firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Hence, this research utilizes tax affective rate as proxies for tax avoidance. The research population is comprised of total companies listed in TSE and the statistical sample includes 87 companies listed in TSE and studied during the years 2007 to 2014. The mean comparison and multivariate linear regression are used for testing the hypotheses of the research. The results suggest that tax aggressiveness in family firms is less than other firms. Also, there is a significant positive relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the CEO in family firms and effective tax rate and the board's oversight role variables adjust this relation. Hence in the family firms, board independence and board size increased and the duality of the role of CEO and Chairman of the Board decreased the relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the CEO and effective tax rate.