Positioning Robustness against GPS Spoofing by Utilizing INS and Loran-C Systems

Nowadays, reliability of systems in designing new navigation systems for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has significant importance. One way to increase the reliability of systems is simultaneous use of multiple systems to reach a particular purpose. The GPS spoofing attack is one of the most important threats for UAV navigation systems in war conditions. In this article, by using INS and Loran-C systems, an integrated architecture is proposed for positioning robustness against GPS spoofing attack which benefits from particle based algorithms. The major concept of the proposed architecture consists of two basic parts; the detection part which is done by hypothesis test and the compensation part which is done by applying data fusion algorithms in the integrated INS/Loran-C systems. In this architecture in addition to the system reliability improvement in the event of a failure of one of the systems, the positioning accuracy in the presence of GPS spoofing attack is increased. So the UAVs can be used with more reliability in hazardous condition with high risk of GPS spoofers. The proposed method validation is proved by Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) metric. The simulation results validate the functionality of the proposed architecture for two GPS spoofing attack scenarios, and also in the case that the GPS and Loran-C are in outage mode, simultaneously.