The Epistemic Value of Theologic Argument

Among the critiques provided on the proofs for the knowledge of God is the questioning of their hyperrealism. Some of these critiques are also valid for fundamentalist systems in epistemology, including: non-obviousness of the criterion for the obvious propositions; confusion between inevitability, hyperrealism, and self-contradictoriness of the fundamentalism system.
The main objective of this article is to provide answer to the above-mentioned critiques. To this end, first by separating between acceptance and hyperrealism, the criterion for the success of the proofs for the knowledge of God – not only their acceptance, but also their hyperrealism – would be introduced. Then, by answering the objections brought up, the hyperrealism of these proofs would be explained. The most important solution in explaining the inevitability and hyperrealism is to connect the primary proofs to the objective reality by relying on the presential knowledge