Aristotle and the Subject of Metaphysics

According to some interpretations, Aristotle's metaphysics is not a coherent and unified work and does not follow a single issue; in other words, in each two or three books a subject is introduced as a subject of metaphysics. ; For example, in the fourth book, Aristotle refers to a new phrase “being qua being” and in the seventh book, he used the term “Ousia” as the subject of this episteme. In this paper, we try to clarify Aristotle's view of these terms, as well as their relationship with each other, and also with other concepts that play an essential role in Aristotle's metaphysics (such as the concept of essence and form). In this way, it becomes clear whether an alternative interpretation can be presented to show that Aristotle has been able to establish a new episteme with a new and unique subject in this book and has been able to respond to the difficulties of the Beta book (aporia of Beta) as a the guideline of Metaphysics. By concentrating on four books of Metaphysics (I, III, IV, and VII), this article tries to investigate the above items and show Aristotle's innovations in some positions, as well as some aspects of his philosophical differentiation of Plato's philosophy.