Iran’s Nuclear Deal Analysis in The Framework of Putnam’s Two Level Game Theory

The nuclear deal between the Islamic Republic of Iran and P5+1 in 2015, JCPOA, ended to 12 years of crisis and tension between the two sides. What made the last round of negotiations between the parties, which began in 2013, to be successful unlike the previous rounds? This study seeks to provide an answer to the above question using a two level game theory in an eclectic manner. The results of this study indicate that, on the one hand, the effects of economic sanctions which led to the increase of economic problems and the unceasing increase in corruption in the country led to a consensus among the authorities to resolve the case as soon as possible, and hence, the JCPOA could be seen as the product of the Islamic republic of Iran in its entirety. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic’s resistance against sanctions and economic pressures and the development of the nuclear industry has led the western side to come to a conclusion that it is unlikely that Islamic Republic of Iran will abandon its nuclear program due to economic pressure. Therefore, a common interest between the Iranian side and the western side was created to close this case, which resulted in the agreement. Therefore, the JCPOA can be seen as the result of overlapping of the common interests of both sides.