Commonsensical Realism and Pragmatic Rationalism;(On Deliberative Nature of Rationality)

The prevalence of reductionist dualisms, driven from some conceptual opposites such as realism vs. constructivism or rationalism vs. relativism, has been one of the most significant impacts of post-positivist challenge in epistemology. How one can explain ‘rationality’, as objective examination of reasonability of a sentence or standpoint, despite the challenges driven from anti-foundationalism? To respond the question, the present paper hypothesizes that such possibility can be found in a particular narrative of Pragmatism which is founded on a commonsensical perception of reality and practical definition of the reasonable. A feature in rationalistic process of examining the scientific sentences or normative standpoints on which the principle of the truth / rational validity might be founded is the axis to the above-mentioned explanation. The feature is “deliberation” and openness to verification. Accordingly, the present paper seeks to highlight a central common feature by which a wide range of theorists in fields of philosophy of science and social science epistemology could be interrelated. Inasmuch as the narrative deals with issues like the nature of reality and the conditions required for acquiring rational understanding of the reasonability, the paper would be organized based on a meta-theoretical framework driven from Aristotle`s notion of Pharonisis.