Examining the appropriate pattern of moral hazard in the non-financial terms of oil and gas contracts

Today, oil has a lot in the economy of its producing countries. For numerous reasons, including the colonial relations between the producing countries and the colonial peoples on the one hand, and the lack of specialist forces and the necessary capital for oil production in the Third World countries, with the participation of mainly capitalists from industrialized countries. For this reason, the legal nature of these relationships has been the subject of many discussions. On the one hand, the general and economic aspects and its moral hazard for the host country and the private aspects of capitalism have added to the difficulty of the discussion. The financial and non-financial conditions of such contracts have changed dramatically in different periods of history, creating many patterns. The political and economic changes in the world, in turn, have brought about changes and changes in the context of these relations and its moral hazard. A survey of the first form of these oil relations, signed under the title "Concession Concession" of capital investors with oil-rich governments, has revealed that today's conventional contracts can outline the different aspects of morality in these contracts. In this paper, the study of the appropriate model of moral hazard in the non-financial conditions of oil and gas contracts in Iran is carried out in a descriptive-analytical manner..