Freedom and Practical Reason in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy in Light of Wissenschaftslehre of Fichte

The Kantian smack of Fichte’s thought naturally propels an investigator to trace the Kantian issues in Fichte’s philosophy which he called Wissenschaftslehre. Then again, I claim it is just in the light of Kantian Practical Philosophy and through digging the Second Critique, not the First, that we can unmask the substantial debt of Fichte to Kant. The supremacy of the practical, this Kantian idea, would be the seed of Wissenschaftslehre’s development. Expanding this doctrine, particularly around the concept of Freedom, Fichte insists this concept is the beginning of every consistence and acceptable Metaphysics. Therefore, after examining the intellectual climate of the late 18th Century Germany and the idea of primacy of the Practical reason over Theoretical reason we derive from the Second Critique, we ultimately look for the freedom in Wissenschaftslehre.