A Philosophical Study on the Relation of Jurisprudence to ethics

The rule of Justice is among the doctrines of Shiite which implies the belief in rational good and bad. According to this rule accepting validity of the rational judgments proposition is preceded by accepting the revelation. In other words, accepting the revelation is based upon the rational judgments. Shiite jurisprudents believe that independent rational judgments are a source for religious judgments. They also have no doubt that independent rational and certain judgments are prior to their understanding of the religious texts. However, they admit that the instances of such rational judgments are very rare.
In this context, some contemporary writers indicate that considering that the jurisprudential inferences generally do not satisfy the criterion of the epistemic certainty, On the one hand, independent rational judgments should include non-certain judgments derived from new sciences, and on the other hand the jurisprudential inferences must always coordinate itself with moral judgments which are preceding to religiosity. And by moral judgments they mean the judgments based on secular ethics. As a result, secular moral judgments will be the criterion for evaluating any type of jurisprudential inferences.
This article shows how this claim relies on conflicting assumptions and not only confuses the applications of non-certain judgments in different fields, but also ignores the basic foundation of rational religiosity upon which there are several religious judgments beyond reason spatially in the practical realm of rationality. By distinguishing these areas, it turns out that the general approach of the jurists is based on the epistemological justification of the moral judgments and they are regarding the relation of the moral judgments to the religious duties