A Critical Consideration of Baker’s Materialistic Formulation of Posthumous Life

In answer to the metaphysical question of the possibility of life after death, some people find the possibility of posthumous life more compatible with materialism than with immaterialism. Lynne Baker is one of the best-known contemporary philosophers of religion who has defended the idea, and has tried to formulate the view in terms of “constitution,” though her attempt has given rise to reactions. Some opponents believe that the main problem with her view is its internal inconsistency, which is central to the problem of life after death; that is, the idea of “unity without identity.” This paper presents a similar, and not an identical, criticism. The paper does not aim to show that it is inconsistent to emphasize on unity and reject identity at the same time; instead, we seek to show that the idea of “unity without identity” or non-reductive materialism does not actually find a clear-cut formulation in terms of her concept of constitution, whether or not its defensible. Thus, Baker’s main project is highly ambiguous. In the final section of the paper, we have sought to consider ways out of the ambiguity by drawing upon conceptual possibilities in the present literature of contemporary metaphysics, particularly the notion of realization.