Duration and The Original Temporality

In Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges Bergson as a pivotal thinker with respect to time and praises his attempt to overcome the traditional concept of time. But he claims that Bergson’s way of doing so ultimately fails. Because the concept of duration as “qualitative succession of conscious states” is still involved with the components of traditional time like succession. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, he argues that Bergson misunderstands Aristotle’s account of time in ways that lead to the view that Aristotle reduces time to space. In this article, I have considered Heidegger’s critiques, and have concluded that these critiques seem to be correct. According to Heidegger, the duration is not original Temporality. The original time is understood with respect to Being, which is neglected in the definition of duration. Time is a temporality of the existence of Dasein. By analyzing the existence of Dasein as a care, time cannot be present-at-hand. the temporality of Dasein is nothing but a process that temporalizes itself. The temporalizing is the condition of both meanings of time; traditional time and duration.