Moore’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s View on It

In his two articles, J. E. Moore refers to two sentences in each one there is contradiction between the starting part of the sentence and the ending part of it and this is named Moor’s paradox: “I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don’t believe that I did” “I believe that he has gone out, but he has not”. The paradox, Moore thinks, is in the controversy between the paradoxical and absurdly speech one says on himself in one side and the truthfulness of that speech in the other. There are several problems about this paradox and one of them is that this paradox is related to not only the assertion but also the belief, thought and desires. The other problem is that in relation to the paradox we have to distinct the omissive version of it: “p but I don’t believe that p” from the commissive version of it: “I believe that p but ~p”. the discovery of this paradox is regarded by Wittgenstein as the most important act of Moore in which a certain meaningless and absurdity has been revealed and he speaks of the deeply impact of it on him. This research will assess Moore’s paradox regarding his commentator’s views notably Wittgenstein.