The Epistemological Value of Relativism’s Types

By reviewing some researches, it seems that the critique of positivism in the humanities, or any statement of pluralism and nativeism, has come to be seen as falling into the trap of relativism. The origin of this view can be due to the lack of attention to the various meanings of relativism. Relativism is generally considered as a general concept, rooted in the skepticism of the Sophists and reproduced by post-positivists in various fields. As human beings are the criterion of everything, and in the absence of absolute truth, the Consequences of knowledge completely change from one person to another, to the extent that the Incommensurability of paradigms and the impossibility of dialogue will be its natural result. Precision in the dimensions of the issue illustrates the fact that relativism is not a single unit and has many varieties. With more evidence, the result is that what is famous for relativism in some cases essentially suffers from verbal contrasts with relativism in its extreme meaning, and in some cases the belief in such teachings is not only a fall in skepticism, but also seems to be a sensible and correct. Authors, by differentiating and explaining these types, have tried to offer all kinds of imaginable relativism in the social science in the proposed optimal model and evaluate each of them epistemologically.