The possibility of avoiding naturalistic fallacy in ethics from the viewpoint of Michael Ruse

The naturalistic approaches to ethics try to find some solution to problems of moral philosophy with an emphasis on finding of empirical science. One of the most famous naturalistic approaches to ethics is evolutionary approach. Evolutionary explanations of morality have always been accused of committing naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy has two Humean and Moorian versions. Hume's reading, also known as deductive version of the naturalist fallacy, suggests that the inference of values from facts is a kind of fallacy. Moore's version of naturalistic fallacy, says that defining moral properties based on immoral properties, and in particular natural properties, is impossible. In this article, after introducing Ruse's evolutionary ethics, his reasons for not having been committed to naturalistic fallacies are brought. Then we answer this question if he really avoided the fallacies. Our answer to this question is yes. But, along with critics like Rottscheafer and Martinsen, we will show that the cost of avoiding these fallacies has been to discarding the objectivity of ethics.Would Ruse without endorsing an illusionary and subjective account of morality avoid the naturalistic fallacy? We will demonstrate that such a reading can be offered by giving a greater role to culture. Thus, the purpose of the article is to oppose the Ruse's illusionary readings of morality and to defend an objectivist reading. In our opinion, elements of this reading can also be found in the work of the Ruse himself and will be offered at the end of the article.