The Verification Regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the possible technical and security implications of its approval for the Islamic Republic of Iran

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty introduced to international arena, while nuclear weapons were expanding with the Non Proliferation Treaty existing by the time. Thus, to prevent increasing of nukes and prohibiting nuclear tests, this inclusive treaty was born as a fundamental and necessary step by the Nuclear Club support for the new members. Based on the content, the supervision on the implementation of commitments by members is executed all the way through “International Monitoring System” (IMS) by compiling, processing and dissemination of data gathered from Seismic Stations, Radionuclide, Infrasound Stations and Hydroacoustic Network. Such system marks all probable nuclear outbursts throughout the globe promptly within land, air and sea; and transmits it online to the Vienna located “International Data Center” for the ample process. In this regard, the current paper aims at elaborating on the Treaty Verification regime and the scrutiny on the possible threats as well as technical, political and security challenges for the Islamic Republic of Iran upon ratification. The authors presume the verification of treaty encompasses structural and technical weaknesses and challenges, which could be threat bearing for security and military, and limitative politically and governmentally. Furthermore, benefitting from the technical privileges and support, the nuclear experienced states may manufacture the verification system for their target countries in addition to access to their clandestine and confidential military intelligence.