Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Analysis of Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Presuppositions of Behavior

In this paper, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s analysis of the origination process of human behavior(/action) will be discussed. Al-Rāzi analyzes human behavior not as a single-factor phenomenon, but as a multi-factor one. According to him, behavior is the result of epistemic and non-epistemic presuppositions. Awareness is the pivotal idea in his analysis of epistemic presuppositions. Al-Rāzī treats awareness as an impulse(da’i) and most of the effects such as will, expedience, and corruption are referred back to it. In al-Rāzī’s definition, da’i is formalized as the human awareness of pleasure, goodness, perfection, and happiness. In this article, after analyzing this definition and describing the role of practical reason in awareness and its utilization of theoretical reason, the authors examine al-Rāzī’s conception of the role of non-epistemic presuppositions in the origination of behavior. These views have been classified on two levels: theological and meta-theological. On the theological level, belief in God and His will; and on the meta-theological level, essential differences among human souls, epistemological effects, social context, cultural context, colleagues and peer groups, bodily structure and temperament, nutrition, environment and the issue of internalization have been analyzed as the primary grounds for the origination and development of behavior. Al-Rāzī’s theory always retains awareness in the origination of action and considers the non-epistemic factors in awareness to be the most important determinative in the origination of action; and thus denies their repulsive replaceability status with respect to each other.