The Criterion for the Distinction of Demonstrative Knowledge, and its Difference with the Criterion for the Distinction of other Knowledge

The history of the technical discussion of the question of the distinction of knowledge and its criterion goes back to the time of the formulation of logic. In his book “argument”, Aristotle argues that the criterion for the distinction of knowledge is the discrepancy in subject and, consequently, the discrepancy in the issues and foundations of knowledge. Muslim logicians such as Farabi and Ibn Sina have also discussed the distinction of knowledge in terms of the differences in subjects or of different states of the same subject. While Aristotle and the Muslim logicians following him have argued that the criterion for the distinction of knowledge is the epistemological nature of demonstrative knowledge rather than the absolute knowledge, their view does not contradict the argument that the criterion for the absolute distinction of knowledge can be in subject, method, or end. Therefore, the criterion for the distinction of demonstrative knowledge cannot be imposed on the criterion for the distinction of non-demonstrative knowledge. Contrary to this approach, some believe that the criterion for the distinction of all knowledge is the end or purpose of the formulation of knowledge. Others believe that the criterion for distinguishing all knowledge is the congruity in their problems. Still some argue that there is no real criterion for the distinction of knowledge and that such distinction is merely arbitrary. The following paper shows that these views are incorrect and incompatible with the teachings of Muslim scholars. It is also pointed out that Muslim scholars have expressed various interpretations of the distinction in the subjects of the knowledge, these interpretations suggest two kinds of general and partial distinction in knowledge, and the relation of differences and commonalities of knowledge can be of several kinds in the partial distinction.