Real Earnings Management and Market Value of Cash Holdings: The Role of Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis and Combination of Interpersonal Deception Theory and Signaling Theory

Firm's cash holding has attracted an increasing attention of both the members of the profession and the academics. The presence of defects in the market indicates that firm's cash holding has a significant effect on the market. Meanwhile, the presence of effective monitoring mechanisms inside and outside the firm would prevent misuses of firm's cash, and subsequently, destroying firm's cash value. Real earnings management, efficient monitoring hypothesis, interpersonal deception theory and signaling theory are proposed categories in the building trust and monitoring environment which have been considered in this study. This study attempted to examine the effect of real earnings management on the market value of the cash holding as well as the impact of active institutional ownership (as an example of efficient monitoring hypothesis) and audit partner rotation (as an example of interpersonal deception theory and signaling theory combination) on this relationship. For this purpose, the data from 156 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012 to 2018 and panel data model were used. The results showed that market values firm's cash holding positively, and real earnings management make investors consider less value for firm's cash holding. Also efficient monitoring hypothesis and combination of interpersonal deception theory and signaling theory were confirmed.