The link between economics and law to provide a conceptual framework for Analysis of the enforcement of Business Enforcement Rules

Reforming official institutions as enacting economic laws and regulations and guaranteeing their implementation, these reforms need to form a collective action among its stakeholders. Although the formation of this collective action among actors with conflicting motives may increase the chances of such reforms succeeding, economic considerations face significant barriers such as transaction costs. After the theory of collective action for voluntary public procurement and transaction cost theory challenged the presumption of the omnipotent and benevolent government, how the decision-making processes within the public sector evolved. In this paper, we attempt to provide a conceptual framework for examining the transaction costs associated with the collective action of political, administrative, and economic actors to guarantee the implementation of laws as a voluntary public good. Such action requires the pursuit of information seeking, bargaining and negotiation activities, and ensuring that political, economic, and administrative actors perform the transactions. The results of the conceptual framework, developed on the basis of the combination of theories of collective action and transaction cost in this paper, show that 18 components influence the costs of collective action for institutional reform. The application of this framework for analyzing the enforcement of business environment facilitation laws, in particular the Law on Continuous Improvement of the Business Environment Approved in Iran in 2011 shows that in addition to the lack of legal enforcement guarantees and external oversight deficiencies, there are several components that can cost the collective action required to enforce these laws.