Investigating the Relationship between CEO's Tenure and Lack of Transparency in Company Information

Very able CEOs may also choose to disclose more information in order to signal the market about their superior skills, whereas less able CEOs may signal-jam the market's inferences about their ability levels by not providing full information and misleading the market, so that they hide behind the shield of high corporate opacity. The main purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between CEO's tenure and lack of transparency of information in companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Research hypotheses based on a statistical sample consisting of 106 companies during a 9-year period from 2009 to 2017 were tested using multivariate regression models. The results of this research show that there is a positive and significant relationship between CEO's tenure and lack of transparency in company information (including: index rate of lack of transparency in company information, trading volume, and the price difference in company stock trading). Also, there is no meaningful relationship between CEO's tenure and lack of transparency in company information (including: stock market analysts' prediction error and discretionary accrual items).