The Effects of the Theory of Legal Orders (Khitābāt-e Qānūnī) of Imam Khomeini on the Islamic Revolution

Discussions on the necessity or even permissibility of revolution and of forming an Islamic government has been a challenging issue in political fiqh of the contemporary world. Part of these disputes is concerned with the problem of ability of overthrowing the Pahlavi regime and running the society after the establishment of government and the duty of the legally competent to undertake religious obligations in this regard. It seems that in relation to this dispute, Imam Khomeini’s particular idea concerning the way in which the legal order is addressed to the legally competent persons, i.e. the theory of legal orders and its implication; that is, the idea of power as not being the condition for religious obligation (taklif) has had a direct effect on their functions in direction of the Islamic Revolution. This article, having studied the possible effect of Imam Khomeini’s theory of legal orders on the Islamic Revolution in two forms, i.e. “doubts on power” and “knowledge of the lack of power” comes to the conclusion that Imam Khomeini’s fundamentalist principle on which the legitimacy of revolution is based is essential to the theory of legal orders in connection with the idea of power as a condition in cases where knowledge of the possibility of gaining power is conceivable.