Futures Studies and Analyzing the Final State of the Economy Section of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Based on Game Theory

Acquiring an understanding of the futures of events is one of the main obsessions of authorities in any country. In so doing, many methods have been explained, one of the most famous of which is the Game Theory that predicts how rationalized is the position of actors in a multilateral interaction. Firstly, game theory includes general principles for modeling, and secondly, it has various methods (strategy) in order to analyze the process of gaming and achieve the final result. One of the most prominent of IRI's strategic problems that has been presented internationally as the most important multilateral issue in recent years is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which finally led to failure as the United States withdrew, and Iran's economic interests were not met in the nuclear deal. Now, the question is whether the JCPOA could have been able to meet Iran's demands and other actors simultaneously? Was the U.S withdrawal from the JCPOA due to change of the governing party, or was so planned from the outset? Once an analysis of the economy section of the JCPOA by game theory was carried out, it was proved that the future of this deal cannot be predicted from the perspective of the optimal strategy of Pareto. Also, Finally, the common answers proved that the economy section of the JCPOA, even with the analytical methods of the Game Theory, had no answer from the very beginning, and that the United States caused it to fail. It follows that in order for the agreement to take place, one of the actors should have to withdraw from their demands and preferences.