The interactive effect of the auditor's size on the relationship between political connections, financial helplessness and agency costs in the Companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange.

The aim of this research is to determine interactive effect of the auditor's size on the relationship between political connections, financial crisis and agency costs. Auditors can affect the selection of accounting methods by management and undesirable effects of ownership separation of and management can be diluted by reducing information asymmetry between consumers and suppliers. Top executives and administrators are often considered powerful because they can benefit from a set of benefits. A strong increase in financial confidence can lead to the bankruptcy of a large financial or non - financial institution. It is directly related to mistrust of the government's future policies. The statistical sample of this research consists of 90 companies in the time period of 1388 to 1396. The inferential statistic is based on logit regression, in which the combined data analysis and integration is used. The results of the first hypothesis showed that audit quality has a significant negative effect on the financial crisis of companies. The results of the second hypothesis showed that the effect of mediating the audit quality on the relationship between political connections and agency costs has a significant negative effect. The results of the third hypothesis showed that the effect of the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between political connections and financial crisis has no significant effect.