Analysis and Critiques on the Theory of Reference of Assertive self-evident Propositions to Immediate Knowledge

Self-evident propositions as the foundation of Philosophy possess a significant position, but due to various reasons, they have been discussed only in margins. To explain the validity and inerrancy of these propositions, philosophers come up with different ideas. One of these Ideas was suggested by Misbah Yazdi in which he refers them to immediate(presential) knowledge in order to benefit from the unerring feature of this kind of knowledge. Among all self-evident propositions in formal logic, he only considers the inner experience and prime knowledge(Awwaliyat) as two true and eligible instances of self-evident, because among all only these two meet the criteria of being self-evident, and because He believes that sensory knowledge is the source of the mistake, thus he tries to separate self-evident propositions from sensory perception and tie them up to immediate knowledge in order to guarantee the truth of these propositions. But this theory seems to have some errors, in this article we try to explain his theory and then elaborate on the features of immediate knowledge to discover some objections to this novel but apparently incomplete theory.