An Analysis of the Double-Sided Divisions of Existence based on Sadrian Philosophical System

One of the principles of existence is its commensurability with actuality, externality, and unity. Accordingly, the problem is that this commensurability requires the other divisions, i.e., potential, mental, and multiple types of existence, to exit its domain of divisions. Later philosophers have tried to resolve this problem by adding two soulish and relative values. Regarding the soulish value, the actuality, unity, and externality of an existent are considered without comparing it to other existents, thus existence becomes commensurate with actuality, unity, and objectivity. Regarding the relative aspect, existences are compared to other existences, find their place in the division, and become the divided of the side in front of it. However, there is another problem because, based on the second assumption, the other side will not be compatible with the meaning of the divisions being the divided. This is because the divisions are separate from each other and have nothing in common; otherwise, the division would be meaningless. Apparently, this problem arises when dealing with the principiality of being and quiddity and ontological separation because the first division has been formed based on the philosophical system of early philosophers and is compatible with its fundamental principles. Following a comparative analytic method of content analysis, the present paper examines the roots of the changes in the double-sided divisions of existence and demonstrates that they were initially developed in the works of philosophers before Mullā Ṣadrā without taking the problem of the principiality of existence into consideration. However, they were later reinterpreted on the basis of this principle and, thus, created this problem. An analysis of this problem based on Sadrian principles could lead to an acceptable justification in this regard.