Epistemological Gap and Deconstruction of Subjectivism in Nietzsche's philosophy

Nietzsche's version of deconstructing the concept of the Subjectivism is based on the epistemological gap from classical and modern understandings of knowledge, truth, language and awareness. To reinterpret the human being as a being perpetually evolving within the web of physiological processes, he presents a new framework in which tries to interpret and evaluate such phenomena as knowledge, truth, language and thought, again. Nietzsche's aim is setting aside knowledge and the will of absolute truth as its main drive, and instead, introducing another drive that employs knowledge as an instrument. For him, the discovery of truth is an illusion originated from focusing upon the two inseparable constituents of the Subject, to say, language and awareness. Instead of the ideal of knowledge and the discovery of truth, he places the concepts of interpretation and evaluation; the former determinates the meaning, usually particular, of the phenomenon, while the latter specifies the hierarchy of meanings with no bearing on their plurality. Our core question in the present paper is ‘how can Nietzsche deconstruct the concept of the Subject in spite of his breaking with its modern epistemological aspects’. And our main claim is that the deconstruction of the Subject can only be understood if we understand Nietzsche’s criticism of such concepts as truth, knowledge, language and awareness.