The main problem in this paper is a comparison between the two notions of happiness and immortality in the views of Ibn ‘Arabī and Kierkegaard as Muslim and Christian intellectuals, respectively. The comparison, made with a descriptive-analytic method, is meant to identify the foundations and consequences of the views along with a recognition of what is shared and distinct in their formulations of this-worldly and afterlife functions of morality. We find that, in Ibn ‘Arabī’s view, happiness is to assume the divine characters and to instantiate the divine names; that is, it is conceptually equivalent to, and coextensive with immortality. In this way, in its ascending arc, the human being makes a loving move toward moral happiness and hence toward immortality. In Kierkegaard’s view, however, morality is the acquisition of this-worldly virtues conceptually and extensionally distinct from acting upon divine commands and immortality with faithful individuation. Relying on faith, Kierkegaard sees morality as the degree of those who fail the divine test. Therefore, he believes that the mortal moral hero is lower than the immortal chivalry of faith. Given the foundations and assumptions of the two intellectuals, Ibn ‘Arabī’s account in which religious and moral lives are identified with each other seems preferable to Kierkegaard’s view in which morality is deemed a lower degree of faithful life.
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