An Analysis of Expedient Lies and the Possibility of their Moral Permissibility in Criminal Law

In this paper, we analyze the concept and nature of lies and their types with a focus on expedient lies, the criterion for identifying expediencies, and the conditions under which they are justified, as well as their implications and consequences in the field of criminal law. We conclude that expedient lies are justified in exceptional cases where the expediency is known and the rule of “the more important and then the less important” applies by someone who has intellectual virtues prior to moral virtues-someone whose practical reason can identify the expediency which is moral to be observed. In these exceptional circumstances, there is no right to telling lies. When the circumstances obtain, expedient lies are just morally justifiable. In principle, in the realm of criminal law, it is impermissible to extend such a justification about expedient lies to false testimonies as well as false complaints and defenses, and it is necessary to observe truthfulness in criminal trials, and particular in gathering evidence. Truthfulness in interrogation of the accused is an obligatory preliminary of the legitimacy of gathering evidence. Those in charge in criminal justice should also avoid any lies and deceptions in their jurisdiction.