Epistemological Nihilism: The Failure of Signs in Wittgenstein's Metaphysics and Epistemology

Although Wittgenstein is known as one of the opponents of philosophical skepticism, some aspects of his epistemology in the picture theory of language and the philosophy of ordinary language have nihilistic features. According to Wittgenstein's linguistic attitude, these features are intertwined with his semiotics and metaphysics and are inseparable. This article examines the nihilistic tendencies in Wittgenstein's semiotics and metaphysics and analyzes the nihilistic features in his epistemology. From Wittgenstein's point of view, the sign cannot refer to an extraterrestrial world, to us, to the other, or to philosophical implications. He denies the possibility of research in metaphysics: in Tractatus because of the limitations of logic, in PI because of the non-application of metaphysical expressions, and in On Certainty because of inevitability of the linguistic frameworks governing doubt and certainty. Accordingly, in a logical space, nothing is really recognizable because cognition is confined to meta-logic. Cognition is completely relative, temporal, and contextual, because our world is only a possible world, and not just the world that exists. However, Wittgenstein does not say that cognition is absolutely impossible, but that cognition is a function of our logic and linguistic play, and not directly a function of the things or facts. Now, although logic and linguistic play are not unrelated to the fact, this does not mean that they reflect reality.