The Ontological Relation of the Corporeal Subject to the World in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

In this article, we try to show that in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, the body as a bodily subject has an ontological relationship with the world due to its own existential modes. To explain this, it is necessary to know the nature of perception, which is inherently existentially related to the body and consequently to the world. Show me. In general, Merleau-Ponty, by criticizing the duality of Descartes' soul and body in the philosophical tradition and reducing the soul or subject to the realm of thought, tries to prove the corporeality of the subject and to show that the corporeal subject is of the type or flesh of the natural world. And therefore its relation to the world is a natural and existential relation. Thus, by proposing concepts such as the bodily subject, the flesh, the bodily view, being in the world, etc., Merleau-Ponty seeks to show ontologically that we have complex relations with the world, and without understanding these relations one cannot know He had himself and the world.