Interactional International Law: A Non-hierarchical Approach to Unilateralism and Domination in International Law

The present study attempts to investigate the problem of unilateral violation of international law through the lens of the recently released doctrine of interactional international law and the way this theory deals with unilateralism. According to this theory, international law inherently confirms the necessity of unilateral action, but at the same time, if powerful States violate any principle of law unilaterally, there is no guarantee to enjoy legitimacy and legality and sustain that action in international relations. Also, this phenomenon of unilateralism is useful in the social practice of international law-making; however, to enjoy legality it must conform with the common understandings of other actors. Otherwise, it would end up in exceptionalism-exemptionalism, lacking any degree of legality and legitimacy. Eventually, the research concludes that going beyond the dichotomy of violation-punishment, the impotence of great powers in imposing and legally justifying their behavior would be obvious in case they cannot come along with the common understandings of the whole international interactional network. To do so, as a primary question at stake, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: how will the theory of interactional international law respond to the unilateral violation of international rules by powerful States? Also, how will it cope with the re-emergence of domination within the international legal system?