The Ontology of International Law: From Denial to Theoretical-Functional Acceptance

The riddle of international law being ” law” has consistently been one of the primary challenges international law has encountered, even in its relatively more modern branches. In response to authors like Austin who contended that international legal norms are not law but morality, some scholars asserted that despite the uneven distribution of power among states, the weakness of sanctions in a legal order does not mean that it does not exist. Also, the notions of sovereignty and the will of states, as the basis of international relations, are legal conceptions and so, international law literally does exist. In fact, the unique elements of the international society and hence international law need to be thoroughly digested. Furthermore, a functional approach leads us to the legal quality of international law. Undoubtedly, all society-based relations and the collective struggle of society members to gain common interest require some sort of law. In other words, it is inevitable that the international community needs international law.